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MUNICIPAL PUBLIC UTILITY POWERS
JAMES W. FARRELL, JR.*
One of the principal purposes sought to be achieved through the
adoption of article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, in 1912, was to
empower municipalities to acquire and operate public utilities free of
any control or interference by the state legislature and thus at least
partially satisfy the then existing popular demand that steps be taken
to provide proper public utility services to metropolitan areas. The
specific constitutional grants of power to municipalities to acquire
and operate public utilities are contained in sections 4 and 6 of
article XVIII.1 Section 4 of article XVIII2 authorizes any munci-
pality to acquire, construct, own, lease and operate any public utility
the product or service of which is or is to be supplied to the munici-
pality or its inhabitants. Section 6 of article XVIII3 authorizes any
municipality owning or operating a public utility for the purpose of
supplying the service or product thereof to the municipality or its
inhabitants to sell the surplus service or product thereof to persons
outside the corporate limits of the municipality.
In this article various decisions of the Supreme Court of Ohio
will be examined for the purpose of (1) determining the scope of
municipal power to acquire and operate public utilities; (2) the
merits or demerits of such decisions; and (3) whether the stated aim
of the drafters of article XVIII, to empower municipalities to own
and operate public utilities without let or hindrance from the state
legislature has been achieved.
* City Counsel, Cincinnati, Ohio.
1 Sections 5 and 12 of article XVIII also deal with municipal utilities but are not
discussed in this article. Section 5 is concerned only with the procedure that must be
followed in the initial acquisition or construction of municipal utilities and section 12
confers special bond issuing authority for financing public utilities.
2 Ohio Const., art. XVIII, § 4. [Acquisition of public utility; contract for
service; condemnation.] Any municipality may acquire, construct, own, lease and operate
within or without its corporate limits, any public utility the product or service of
which is or is to be supplied to the municipality or its inhabtants, and any contract
with others for any such product or service. The acquisition of any such public utility
may be by condemnation or otherwise, and a municipality may acquire thereby the
use of, or full title to, the property and franchise of any company or person supplying
to the municipality or its inhabitants the service or product of any such utility.
(Adopted September 3, 1912.)
3 Ohio Const., art. XVIII, § 6. [Sale of Surplus.] "Any municipality, owning or
operating a public utility for the purpose of supplying the service or product thereof to
the municipality or its inhabitants, may also sell and deliver to others any transporta-
tion service of such utility and the surplus product of any other utility in an amount
not exceeding in either case fifty per centum of the total service or product supplied by





In reviewing the decisions dealing with sections 4 and 6 of article
XVIII it is helpful to have in mind the historical background against
which article XVIII was drafted and adopted.
Under the constitution of 1802, municipal corporations were
generally incorporated pursuant to special acts of the legislature
granting charters which established the form of government for, and
enumerated the substantive powers of the municipality chartered.
This method of fixing the form of government of municipalities and
granting substantive powers proved so unsatisfactory that a provision
was written into the constitution of 1851 prohibiting the granting of
corporate power by special act of the legislature. 4 At the same time,
another provision requiring the legislature to provide for the organiza-
tion of cities and incorporated villages by general laws was adopted.'
As cities grew and became more numerous, the need for additional
municipal administrative agencies and broader substantive powers
for the larger municipalities became apparent. Since the constitution
prohibited special legislation granting corporate powers, the necessary
changes in the form of government and increase in substantive powers
could not be effected by special legislation and so resort was had to
an elaborate system of dividing cities into classes and grades, so that
eventually each of the twelve largest cities of the state was in a class
and grade of its own, thus enabling the legislature to pass special laws
for the government of any one of these cities under the guise of gen-
eral legislation. This circumvention of the constitution of 1851 was
finally brought to a halt by a supreme court decision 6 which held
invalid the appointment and election of all municipal officers of the
twelve major cities of the state, because they had been made pursuant
to what the court found to be special acts of the legislature.
Faced with the prospect of these major municipalities being
without legal government, the General Assembly, at a special session
called by the governor for that purpose, repealed all of the constitu-
tionally obnoxious municipal statutes and enacted the Ohio Municipal
Code of 1902, which is basically the same municipal code that is in
effect today. This Code, because it was enacted prior to the adoption
of article XVIII necessarily not only granted to municipalities all
4 Ohio Const. art. XIII, § 1. [Corporate powers.] "The general assembly shall pass
no special act conferring corporate powers."
1 Ohio Const. art. XIII, § 6. [Organization of cities, etc.) "The general assembly
shall provide for the organization of cities, and incorporated villages, by general laws,
and restrict their power of taxation, assessment, borrowing money, contracting debts
and loaning their credit, so as to prevent the abuse of such power."
6 State ex rel. Knisley v. Jones, 66 Ohio St. 453, 64 N.E. 424 (1902).
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their substantive powers, including the power to acquire and operate
public utilities, but also in detail prescribed the village and city forms
of government.
The fact that the same form of government and substantive
powers will not suffice for both a city of 5,000 population and a city
of 100,000 or more population, became more and more apparent with
each year of operation under the Municipal Code of 1902. Dissatis-
faction with the Municipal Code of 1902 was especially strong in the
larger cities which found it difficult to operate efficiently and impos-
sible to provide many necessary municipal services because of the
limited authority granted by the 1902 Municipal Code. The citizens of
the larger cities were, at the same time, vehemently complaining of the
then current practices of privately owned public utilities.
Constitutional Convention Debates
It was with this historical background in mind that the conven-
tion of 1912 undertook the drafting of article XVIII. Professor
Knight, who explained the proposed article XVIII to the constitutional
convention, stated that the three chief purposes sought to be accom-
plished in drafting the amendment were (1) to empower each munici-
pality to adopt a form of government of its own choosing; (2) to give
each municipality authority to carry out municipal functions without
statutory authorization; and (3) to facilitate municipal ownership
and operation of public utilities.
The first objective of the amendment is, according to Professor
Knight, accomplished by sections 2 and 7 of article XVIII which
empower the electors of a municipality to establish the form of gov-
ernment for the municipality by adopting a Charter pursuant to
section 7 of article XVIII, or by adopting one of the optional forms
of government7 established by the state legislature pursuant to section
2 of article XVIII, or by inaction requiring the municipality to use
the general statutory form of city government or village government,
as the case may be, prescribed by the state legislature pursuant to
section 2 of article XVIII. The second objective of the drafters of
article XVIII was accomplished chiefly through section 3 of article
XVIII which confers upon municipalities all powers of local self-
government. The third objective is achieved through sections 4, 6
and 12 of article XVIII.
Professor Knight pointed out to the constitutional convention
that it would not be necessary to change the Municipal Code of 1902,
if article XVIII was adopted, because municipalities that did not
adopt a charter or an optional form of government would continue
7 See, Ohio Rev. Code, c. 705.
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to operate under the applicable general statutory form of government
and that the various statutes, including those dealing with municipally
owned public utilities, granting various substantive powers, even
though they would become meaningless, would not have to be repealed.
It is axiomatic that constitutional grants of authority cannot be
limited or curtailed by the state legislature except as, and to the
extent, authorized by the constitution. The framers of article XVIII
were, of course, aware of this fundamental legal concept and, there-
fore, in drafting said article, specifically authorized the state legisla-
ture to limit such of the constitutional powers granted to municipalities
therein as they thought should be subject to legislative control. Thus
in section 3 of article XVIII the power of municipalities to adopt
police regulations is made subject to the limitation that such regula-
tions cannot be in conflict with state police regulations and in section
13 the legislature is empowered to establish over-all limitations on the
authority of municipalities to incur debts and to levy taxes and assess-
ments. In construing this article of the constitution the "expressio
unius exclusio alterius" rule applies and the power of the legislature
to restrict the exercise by municipalities of the powers therein granted
must be restricted to those powers of limitation expressly conferred




Just three years after the adoption of article XVIII the supreme
court considered the question of whether the state legislature could,
by statute, limit the right of a municipality to acquire a public utility.9
General Code section 3990, which was in effect at that time, provided
that no village in which there was an existing gas or electric works
could proceed to construct a new gas or electric works without first
offering to buy the existing works. The Village of Orrville undertook
to construct its own gas and electric works without first offering to buy
the electric plant of the Massillon Electric & Gas Co. which was located
in and served the village. In answer to the contention that the village
could not proceed to construct a new electrical works without comply-
ing with the provisions of section 3990 the court pointed out that
section 4 of article XVIII confers upon municipalities plenary power
to acquire and construct public utilities and that to the extent General
Code section 3990 is inconsistent with that plenary grant of power
it is unconstitutional.
8 Fitzgerald v. Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338, 103 N.E. 512 (1913).
9 Dravo-Doyle Co. v. Orrville, 93 Ohio St. 236, 112 N.E. 503 (1915).
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In State ex rel. Toledo v. Weiler,'° the right of the state legisla-
ture to indirectly limit or curtail the power of a municipality to
acquire a public utility by prohibiting municipalities from using gen-
eral obligation bonds as a means of financing the acquisition or con-
struction of a public utility was argued. The city of Toledo desiring
to acquire a transportation system for the benefit of the residents of
that city undertook to finance the acquisition thereof by the issuance
of general obligation bonds payable from real estate taxes. The
statutes in effect at that time governing the issuance of general obliga-
tion bonds by municipalities provided that such bonds could be issued
for certain specified purposes and no others. The acquisition of a
transportation system was not one of the specified purposes. Re-
spondents in this case were able to point to the provisions of section
6 of article XIII and section 13 of article XVIII which specifically
empower the state legislature to limit the power of municipalities to
levy taxes and incur debts. It was conceded that the bonds proposed
to be issued by Toledo involved both the incurring of a debt and the
levy of taxes within the meaning of these constitutional provisions.
Although not conceded it was obvious that if municipalities had no
authority to issue general obligation bonds for the acquisition of a
public utility the provisions of section 4 of article XVIII would be
vitiated.
The court approached the question from the standpoint that the
provisions of section 4 of article XVIII are self-executing and confer
upon municipalities plenary power to acquire public utilities, which
power necessarily includes the authority to do all things that are
essential to the acquisition of a utility. The court found that the
issuance of general obligation bonds and the levy of taxes incident
thereto was essential to the acquisition of a public utility and was,
therefore, included in the power conferred by section 4 of article
XVIII. Judge Matthias, speaking for the court, referred to the dis-
cussions in the constitutional convention with respect to the financing
of the acquisition of public utilities and said:
As there suggested, the purpose of these constitutional amendments
was to afford municipalities of the state the opportunity, when
they should choose to do so, to own and operate their public utili-
ties, and to confer upon them expressly and directly full power and
complete authority to accomplish that purpose, the only reserva-
tion being that they must recognize and respect the limitations of
tax levies and indebtedness for local purposes prescribed by law.
But this reservation does not authorize the legislature to annul or
curtail the powers expressly granted by the Constitution. It may
limit the levy of taxes and the extent of bonded indebtedness for
10 101 Ohio St. 123, 128 N.E. 88 (1920).
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local purposes, but it may not, either by action or inaction, pre-
clude the exercise of power expressly conferred by the Constitu-
tion, or deny the use of its revenues from taxation or its general
credit for any purpose authorized by a constitutional provision or
for any purpose within the powers of local self-government thereby
conferred. It was not contemplated that any grant of power by the
legislature was essential, nor that it should be permitted to deny or
limit the purpose, but only prescribe the limitation of taxation
and bonded indebtedness for all local purposes.
This is undoubtedly one of the best pronouncements of the
supreme court with respect to the meaning of the provisions of section
6 of article XIII and section 13 of article XVIII empowering the
state legislature to limit the authority of municipalities to levy taxes
and incur debts and it unequivocally states that these provisions of
the constitution do not empower the state legislature to withdraw
from municipalities or to annul any of the powers granted by sections
4 or 6 of article XVIII or any of the powers of local self-government
conferred by section 3 of article XVIII, but only empowers the state
legislature to prescribe over-all municipal debt and tax limitations
for the purpose of insuring the financial solvency of municipalities.
Unfortunately Weiler has not been followed uniformly by the courts;
yet any other interpretation of these constitutional provisions results
in vitiating or completely nullifying article XVIII. Section 4 of article
XVIII confers upon municipalities the power to acquire and operate
public utilities. Section 3 confers upon municipalities all powers of
local self-government including the power of eminent domain, the
power to contract, the power to levy taxes and the power to provide
any improvements and services for the benefit of the people of the
municipality which serve a proper public purpose." The construction
of any public improvement and the furnishing of public services neces-
sarily requires the expenditure of money which can be obtained, in
the main, only through the levy of taxes or the incurring of debt, or
both. If the state legislature is empowered by section 6 of article
XIII and section 13 of article XVIII, as was contended unsuccessfully
in Weiler, to say to municipalities, "you may only levy taxes and incur
debts for those municipal public improvements or services specified by
statute and no others," article XVIII is rendered meaningless and
municipalities have no constitutional home rule powers with respect to
acquisition and operation of public utilities or any other municipal
functions.
It is axiomatic that constitutional provisions must be read in para
11 State ex rel. Bruestle v. Rich, 159 Ohio St. 13, 110 N.E.2d 778 (1953); State
ex rel. Gordon v. Rhodes, 156 Ohio St. 81, 100 N.E.2d 225 (1951); State ex rel. Fitz-
gerald v. Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338, 103 N.E. 512 (1913).
1960]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
materia and that one constitutional provision cannot be construed as
repealing or nullifying another constitutional provision unless no other
construction is possible. This is especially true when the constitutional
provisions to be construed have all been adopted at the same time as
part of one article of the constitution as were sections 3, 4 and 13 of
article XVIII. The Weiler decision gives full force and effect to all
the provisions of article XVIII and is, therefore, consonant with all
recognized rules of constitutional and statutory interpretation. Any
other construction of section 13 of article XVIII would emasculate or
annul the provisions of sections 3, 4 and 6 of article XVIII and
could not be justified as a matter of law or of common sense.
It is not intended here to contend that Ohio municipalities are in
any sense independent of the State of Ohio but it is contended that
Ohio municipalities are in many matters empowered by the constitution
to act independently of the state legislature. It is conceded that Ohio
municipalities are, in all matters, subject to the control of the state.
This is not, however, equivalent to saying that municipalities are
subject to the state legislature. The legislature is not the state. It is
only one of the state agencies created and empowered by the constitu-
tion. The people, the source of all state power, speak through the con-
stitution and the legislature can operate only in the sphere assigned it
by the constitution. The people of Ohio, through their constitution,
have given municipalities the authority to acquire and operate public
utilities subject only to those limitations set forth in the constitution
and the state legislature can only limit such constitutional grant of
power to the extent it is specifically, or by necessary implication, au-
thorized to do so by the constitution.
The Use of Eminent Domain in Acquisition
The growth of air transportation has given rise to the very
interesting and important legal question of whether a municipality
desiring to construct an airport outside its corporate limits has the
power to appropriate property already devoted to a public use. There
is no question that an airport is a public utility within the meaning of
section 4 of article XVIII,' and that section 4 confers upon munici-
palities the power to acquire by eminent domain property needed for
a municipal public utility even though the property is located outside
the municipal corporate limits.Y
12 Toledo v. Jenkins, 143 Ohio St. 141, 54 N.E.2d 656 (1944); Chandler v. Jackson,
121 Ohio St. 186, 167 N.E. 396 (1929).
13 Bruestle v. Rich, supra note 11, at page 32, 101 N.E.2d at 789, where the court
says, after determining that section 3 of article XVIII confers upon municipalities the
power of eminent domain, "Any doubt as to this is completely dispelled by the provi-
sions of Sections 4 and 10 of Article XVIII, each of which purports to extend the
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This question is presently being litigated by the City of Cincinnati
and the Village of Blue Ash in a case in which Cincinnati is attempting
to appropriate for airport purposes an easement for street purposes
belonging to the Village of Blue Ash. Here we have a novel situation
where a city, having an unlimited grant of constitutional power to
acquire property outside its corporate limits for airport purposes, is
attempting to appropriate from a village, which also has an unlimited
constitutional power of eminent domain, property presently devoted to
street purposes. It is the city's contention that under such circum-
stances the court must examine the facts and determine which public
need is paramount in the particular case and that paramount public
need controls. The village, on the other hand, argues that property
devoted to an existing public use cannot be acquired for another
public use irrespective of the question of how unimportant the existing
public use is to the public and how important to the public welfare
the proposed public use may be. There is a series of Ohio cases which
hold that where the power of eminent domain has been delegated by
the General Assembly to a corporation or political subdivision such
delegated power of eminent domain does not include the right to take
property already devoted to a public use, where such taking would
destroy the prior public use, unless the right to take such property is
expressly or implicitly conferred. This rule of law is not applicable,
however, to a case where a city is not relying on any delegated power
of eminent domain but instead a direct grant of the power of eminent
domain from the people of the state of Ohio through the constitution
which confers upon the city the same power of eminent domain that
is possessed by the state itself and which cannot be limited by the
state legislature.14
As previously noted, in Weiler the supreme court held that section
4 of article XVIII confers upon a municipality all the power and
authority necessary to acquire or construct a public utility either
inside or outside its corporate limits as long as the service of such
utility is to be used by the people of the municipality. Because of
the high landing and takeoff speeds of modern aircraft, modern air-
ports must be large enough to provide runways in excess of 8,000
feet in length. Because of the fact that most cities that require the
services of airports are densely populated, it is necessary, from an
economic point of view, to locate such airports in the areas outside
the city which are sparsely populated. In the sparsely populated areas
it is impossible, because of the length of the runways required, to
authority of a municipality to exercise the power of eminent domain beyond such
authority as would be included within the foregoing words of Section 3 of that Article."
14 Bruestle v. Rich, supra note 11.
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construct an airport without acquiring in some manner, either by
appropriation or vacation, parts of existing street systems. If the
streets cannot be vacated then they must be appropriated or there
can be no airport. It might be said, with respect to such a case, that
the city should locate its airport in an unincorporated area. The facts
of the Cincinnati case are, and this would probably be true of many
other cases, that the area in which the airport is located was unin-
corporated at the time the city began the airport project and that the
incorporation was effected primarily for the purpose of blocking the
airport.
Since practically all, if not all, commercial airports in the state
of Ohio are municipally owned, the importance of this legal question
in the future of air transportation in Ohio cannot be understated. The
problem cannot be resolved by an act of the state legislature because
the legislature cannot confer upon municipalities broader powers of
eminent domain for the acquisition of property for airports than is
already conferred by section 4 of article XVIII, nor can the legisla-
ture limit or curtail the village's power of eminent domain to appropri-
ate property for street purposes conferred by section 3 of article
XVIII. 5 This is a question pure and simple of a conflict between
the exercise of constitutional powers by two different municipalities
and must be resolved by the courts construing and properly applying
the provisions of the constitution.
If it is true that laws, whether constitutional or statutory, should
be interpreted if at all possible to produce results which are reason-
able, the city should prevail in its efforts to appropriate street right-
of-way if it can show that the public need for the airport is greater
than the public need for the street right-of-way in question. 6 In
order to demonstrate that the use for airport purposes of the right-of-
way in question is paramount to the street use it should be sufficient
to show that an airport is needed, that this is a logical place to put
the airport and that the street right-of-way in question can be
abandoned or relocated without seriously interfering with the public's
need for an adequate street system. The question of whether, generally
speaking, the need for airports is paramount to that for streets from
the point of view of public necessity or accommodation is not a factor.
Courts outside the state of Ohio have passed upon this question
and have applied what might be called the rule of reason or the rule
of paramount necessity. In these cases the courts recognize the general
15 Ibid.
16 There is no question with respect to the rights of abutting property owners
because their property can be appropriated for airport purposes and in the instant case
it has already been appropriated and is owned by the city.
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proposition that normally property already devoted to a public use
cannot be acquired for another public use if the new use will destroy
the old. However, the courts recognized that there are cases where
relatively unimportant portions of streets would have to be acquired
for airports or some other public purpose for which there was a great
public need and that under such circumstances it would be judicial
nonsense to hold, in the absence of any constitutional prohibition or
valid statutory prohibition, that the existing public use could not be
appropriated for a new public use for which there was a greater public
need or demand. Based upon this reasoning these courts uphold the
right of a municipality to appropriate portions of streets for airport
purposes in those cases where it could be demonstrated that the
airport would serve the general public and that the abandonment or
relocation of the street in question would involve merely a minor
inconvenience to the general motoring public even though it might
entail a major inconvenience to some small portion of the public."
OPERATION OF UTILITIES
The right of the legislature to directly limit or restrict the opera-
tion of municipally owned public utilities is governed by the same
principles of law that have been heretofore discussed in connection
with the acquisition of public utilities by municipalities. The fact,
however, that the state legislature has no right to directly restrict or
limit the power of municipalities to operate utilities does not mean
that municipally owned utilities are free of all regulation. A municipal
utility, with respect to consumers within the municipality or within
areas having contracts for the utility's service with the municipality,
has the same common law duty of rendering service on a reasonable
and non-discriminatory basis as have privately owned utilities. Fur-
thermore, the state, in the exercise of its police power, can impose
restrictions and limitations upon customers of municipal utilities, as
citizens of the state, and thus indirectly affect the operation of munici-
pal utilities.
Statutory Restrictions
In a long series of decisions the supreme court has struck down
all of the various statutory provisions purporting to regulate or limit
the power of a municipality to operate public utilities. In Camp Lodge
Association"8 the provisions of former General Code section 3963
requiring municipalities to furnish free water to certain eleemosynary
institutions was declared invalid. A provision of the same section
17 City and County of Denver v. Board of County Com., 156 P.2d 101, 113 Colo.
150 (1945); Howard v. Atlanta, 190 Ga. 730, 10 S.E.2d 190 (1940).
18 102 Ohio St. 207, 131 N.E. 349 (1921).
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requiring municipalities to furnish water free of charge to public
schools within the municipality was struck down in a later supreme
court case. 9 The Pfau case2" upheld the validity of an ordinance of
the City of Cincinnati making a property owner responsible for water
bills of his tenants despite the contention that the ordinance was in-
consistent with certain statutory provisions. In Schwenck 2" the
supreme court upheld the right of a municipality to furnish free
municipal electric plant service to agencies of the city notwithstanding
the language of certain statutory provisions which could have been
construed as prohibiting such practice. The provision of Revised
Code section 743.13 requiring municipalities furnishing water services
to consumers outside the municipality to observe a 107 maximum
rate differential between consumers inside and outside the municipality
was nullified in McCann.22
The question of whether the state legislature can make the rates
charged by municipal utilities subject to regulation by the Public
Utilities Commission of Ohio has, of course, never been considered
by the courts since no legislation has ever been enacted purporting
to grant this authority to the Public Utilities Commission. It would
seem clear, from the cases heretofore cited and from an analysis of
the basic principles upon which government regulation of public
utilities is predicated, that the General Assembly would have no
authority to subject municipal utilities to rate regulation by the
Public Utilities Commission or any other state regulatory body.
Ordinarily public utilities cannot operate without special grants
of authority from government. Most utilities require grants from
government of the power of eminent domain and the right to use
public streets for utility installations. As a condition to the grant of
these and other privileges the governmental body granting them
retains the right to control the utility in order to prevent any abuse
by the utility of the granted powers. Thus the state legislature can, in
granting certain powers to a privately owned public utility, say to the
utility that the powers are granted subject to the condition that the
utility operate in conformity with regulations fixed by the legislature.
Municipal utilities, however, do not derive their power to operate
from the state legislature but instead obtain such authority directly
from the constitution. What the state legislature grants it can grant
on conditions. What the constitution grants cannot be limited or
regulated by the state legislature unless, and only to the extent, legis-
19 Board of Ed. v. Columbus, 118 Ohio St. 295, 160 N.E. 902 (1928).
20 142 Ohio St. 101, 50 N.E.2d 172 (1943).
21 166 Ohio St. 415, 143 N.E.2d 586 (1957).
22 167 Ohio St. 313, 148 N.E.2d 221 (1958).
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lative regulation is authorized by the constitution. As previously
pointed out, there is nothing said in the constitution to indicate that
the powers therein granted to municipalities to operate utilities are
subject to regulation or limitation by the state legislature. Hence,
it would appear that the General Assembly has no power to limit or
restrict, by regulation or otherwise, the power and authority of a
municipality to operate a public utility for the purpose of supplying
the product thereof to such municipality and its citizens, or selling
and delivering to others the surplus product or service of such utility,
pursuant to the provisions of sections 4 and 6 of article XVIII.
There is language in some opinions of the supreme court23 which
seems to say that the General Assembly may merely regulate but not
restrict or limit the power of municipalities to operate public utilities.
However, as was pointed out by Judge Taft in McCann,14 every
regulation limits or restricts something and "if a so-called mere statu-
tory regulation of the General Assembly limits or restricts a power
conferred by section 4 or section 6 of Article XVIII, it can be no
more valid or effective than a direct statutory prohibition or limita-
tion on such constitutionally granted power."
Other Restrictions
Municipalities are created, at least in part, for the benefit of and
to serve the residents thereof and the owners of property therein. The
residents of a municipality have constitutional rights which obviously
cannot be ignored by a municipality in the operation of a public
utility. Among these rights are the right to have municipal utilities
furnish their services or products to the inhabitants of the munici-
pality on proper terms and conditions, without discrimination and at
rates which are reasonable.2 Although these constitutional rights of
the inhabitants of municipalities cannot be protected by legislative
regulation they can be and are protected by the judicial branch of
the state in the same manner as other constitutional rights are
protected.
23 City of Akron v. Public Utilities Com., 149 Ohio St. 347, 78 N.E.2d 890 (1948);
Western Reserve Steel Co. v. Village of Cuyahoga Heights, 118 Ohio St. 544, 161 N.E.
900 (192S) ; Butler v. Karb, 96 Ohio St. 472, 117 N.E. 953 (1917).
24 167 Ohio St. at 316, 148 N.E.2d at 224.
25 Western Reserve Steel Co. v. Cuyahoga Heights, supra note 23; Butler v. Karb,
supra note 23. In considering this case it must be remembered that it was decided at
a time when the supreme court was of the opinion that it was necessary for a munici-
pality, in order to gain the benefits of the home rule amendment, to adopt a charter.
In a later decision, Perrysburg v. Ridgeway, 108 Ohio St. 245, 140 N.E. 595 (1923), the
supreme court held that the adoption of a charter is not a prerequisite to a munid-
pality's exercising the substantive powers of home rule conferred by article XVIII.
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Although a municipality has an obligation and duty to furnish
the service or products of its municipal utilities to consumers within
the municipality on a fair and impartial basis, it has no obligation, in
the absence of contract, to furnish the services or products of its
municipal utilities to consumers outside the municipality. Since the
municipality has no obligation, in the absence of contract, to furnish
the products of its municipal utilities to consumers outside the munici-
pality, such services or products can be furnished on any basis the
municipality may select.
In Indian Hill Acres, 26 the owner of property outside the corporate
limits of a city sought to require the city to furnish water to such
property. The city for many years had furnished water to the unin-
corporated areas of the county pursuant to a contract which termi-
nated in 1946. Thereafter, the city determined that it would continue
to furnish water to existing consumers in the unincorporated area of
the county but would not furnish water to any new consumers unless
the consumers agreed to annex to the city. Indian Hill Acres, Inc.,
had subdivided its property and installed therein, under city inspec-
tion and supervision, water mains which it desired to connect to water
mains in the county carrying city water. The city refused to permit
the company's water mains to be connected to such county water
mains because the company refused to agree to annex its property to
the city.27 The company thereupon brought suit to require the city
to permit the connection of the company mains to mains carrying city
water. The court of appeals held for the company on the theory that
once a municipality undertakes to serve water to a particular area it
has the duty to continue to furnish such water not only to existing
consumers in the area but also new consumers in the area on a fair
and impartial basis. The supreme court reversed, holding that in the
absence of a contract a municipality has no duty to furnish water to
consumers outside its corporate limits. In answer to the argument
that the city's policy deprived the residents of the area of their right
to determine whether or not they wished to be annexed to the city,
the court merely pointed out that the city's policy did not compel
annexation and the difficulties entailed in obtaining some other source
of water supply constituted merely an economic problem that might
influence the residents of the area with respect to the desirability of
annexing to the city.
26 149 Ohio St. 461, 79 N.E.2d 319 (1948).
27 It is interesting to note the facts of this case bring it squarely within Ohio Rev.
Code, § 743.13 which provides that when a person at his own expense has laid and
extended water mains beyond the limits of the municipal corporation, under the super-
vision and inspection of the municipal corporation the municipality shall furnish water
to the property owners served by such mains.
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In subsequent cases the right of a municipality to discontinue
water service to a consumer who had agreed to and then refused to co-
operate in effecting the annexation of his property to the municipality
was upheld on the basis that in the absence of a contract a municipality
has no duty to furnish water service to consumers outside its corporate
limits.28
Where a municipality enters into a contract with another political
subdivision pursuant to which the municipality is to furnish the
product or service of its utility to the inhabitants of the other political
subdivision, the municipality is, of course, bound by the provisions of
the contract. In Western Reserve Steel Co.,2 9 the supreme court went
a step further and announced the principle of law that where a munici-
pality contracts to supply water to the public of another municipality,
it dedicates itself to the service of the public of such other munici-
pality, and while it may limit, by contract, the scope and extent of its
duty to the municipality as such, it cannot, while enjoying the privi-
lege and immunities of a public utility, by such contract absolve itself
from the duties toward such public that are cast upon it by law by
reason of such dedication. In that case a city contracted with a
village to furnish the village with water. The contract provided, that
in the event of any delinquent accounts within the village, the village
would pay such amounts to the city and that upon request of the
village the city would terminate water services to any premises within
the village to which water had been furnished but not paid for. A
consumer of water within the village went bankrupt owing the city
for water furnished. The village paid the city the amount due and at
the direction of the village the city discontinued water service to the
premises. The property was then sold to the steel company by the
trustee in bankruptcy and the city refused to furnish water thereto
unless the delinquent water bill was paid to the village. The court
held that the village had no right to make the steel company respon-
sible for the debt of the former bankrupt owner of the premises in
question and ordered the village and city to furnish water to the
company. 30
Although the result reached in this case was undoubtedly correct
it seems that a better approach to the problem would have been that
the village, in contracting for a water supply for the inhabitants
thereof, owed an obligation to the consumers of the village not to
28 Merkel v. Kellogg, C. P. Hamilton Co., Ohio, Case No. A-115602, Ct. App.
Case No. 7243, cert, denied, Supreme Court of Ohio Case No. 32292.
29 118 Ohio St. 544, 161 N.E. 920 (1928).
30 It was not contended and could not have been contended in this case that the
water bill was a lien on the real estate in question.
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enter into any contract which would be discriminatory with respect to
any inhabitants of the village. The provisions of the contract in ques-
tion would be invalid, not by reason of any obligation of the city to
consumers within the village, but by reason of the obligation of the
village not to enter into any contract which would discriminate against
any inhabitants of the village. The court, of necessity, recognized that
the provision of the contract in question was not for the benefit of the
city but solely for the benefit of the village and violated the village's
obligation not to discriminate among its own inhabitants. The in-
validity of this provision of the contract could not, of course, give the
city any right to terminate the agreement because it did not affect
any contract rights of the city and, therefore, the order requiring the
city to furnish water to the company was proper.
This case does not hold, and cannot be construed as holding, in
spite of some broad language in the opinion and syllabus, that a
municipality contracting to furnish water service to another munici-
pality must furnish the inhabitants of such other municipality water
under the same terms and conditions that it furnishes water to its
own inhabitants. It merely holds that where a municipality contracts
to furnish water to another political subdivision it must furnish such
service to all consumers within such other political subdivision on the
same basis. If, for example, the court were to hold that the rates
charged by a city pursuant to a contract to furnish water to consumers
within another political subdivision were too high and thus invalid,
the whole contract would be ineffective and the obligation of the city
to furnish water would be terminated. This result would necessarily
follow from the application of basic principals of law governing
contracts.
USE oF REVENUES
The one field of municipal public utility law in which the decisions
of the courts have been adverse to the operating municipalities is that
of the use of utility revenues for general municipal purposes. In a
series of cases beginning with Roettinger,3' the supreme court has
uniformly upheld the right of the state legislature to prohibit the use
of surplus public utility revenues for general municipal operating
purposes. The thesis upon which the court has sustained such statutes
is that a charge for a municipal utility product or service in excess of
the amount necessary to cover the cost of the product or service
amounts to a tax that can be limited or prohibited by the state legisla-
ture under the provisions of section 13 of article XVIII and section 6
31 105 Ohio St. 145, 137 N.E. 6 (1922); Hartwick Realty Co. v. City of Cleveland,




of article XIII of the constitution. This proposition is unsupportable
either as a matter of law or common sense.
In Roettinger the court found that the statute now designated
Revised Code section 743.05 prohibits a municipality from using water
works revenues for other than water works purposes. In considering
the merits rather than the efficacy, which seemingly is unimpaired,
of Roettinger it must be kept in mind that the court was considering
one of a series of statutes passed by the state legislature prior to the
adoption of the home rule amendment which were, at the time of their
passage, admittedly the only authority for a municipality to operate a
water works and which, because of the dependency of municipalities
upon the largess of the state legislature at the time of the enactment
of such statutes, could limit and curtail municipal public utilities
operations in any manner the state legislature deemed appropriate.
The statute considered in Roettinger did not specifically prohibit
the use of water works revenues for general municipal purposes. To
find such prohibition in the statute required interpretation and search
for legislative intent. Judge Marshall, speaking for the court, said:
It is urged on the one hand that the statute does not expressly
forbid the use of surplus for general municipal purposes and that
in the absence of such prohibition the power must be held to exist.
It is urged on the other hand that the city has only such power
over rates and charges as the legislature has expressly conferred,
and that the construction of the Act must be the same as if the
word "only" was inserted therein. The latter rule of construction
must be adopted, otherwise the entire sentence is rendered meaning-
less. Unless the section holds the city strictly to the purposes
therein named, and if the city authorities may add any other uses
and purpose in expending the surplus, the question must arise
whether any limitations are legally imposed upon the city in the
employment of such surplus. Such a construction must necessarily
lead to absurd results. Municipalities get their authority for levy-
ing taxes and raising revenues from the legislature, and the legisla-
ture must be held to have the power to place proper limitations
thereon.
In answer to the contention that the statute in question has
been superseded or nullified by the adoption of article XVIII, Judge
Marshall opined:
It is important at this point to inquire into the nature of rates and
charges which are in excess of an amount sufficient to pay the cost
of the operation of the water works and to make provision for
repairs, renewals, extensions, new construction, and interest and
principal of debt arising out of the construction. While it is uni-
versally conceded that rates and charges not in excess of the
amount necessary to meet such purposes are not classified as taxes,
it does not follow that such excessive amounts would not be classi-
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fled as taxes .... It is apparent that any effort upon the part of
any municipality to deliberately impose rates and charges for
water supply, not for the purpose of covering the cost of furnish-
ing and supplying the water, but for the purpose of making up a
deficiency in general expenses of the municipality, and which can-
not be met within the limitations of taxation otherwise provided, is
to that extent an effort to levy taxes, and, to the same extent, an
effort to evade the statutory and constitutional limitations upon
that subject. . . It seems very clear on the other hand that by
virtue of the provisions of Article XII and Section 13 of Article
XVIII, the legislature has power to place limitations thereon; and
the provisions of Section 3959 are in the nature of such limitations.
Referring then to the power conferred upon municipalities by sections
4 and 6 of article XVIII of the constitution and admitting that the
state legislature has no authority to pass any law interfering with or
burdening municipal operation of public utilities and stating that the
court did not intend to in any way alter, amend or detract from either
the letter or the spirit of the home rule provisions of the constitution,
Judge Marshall averred:
If it has been intended by the people that municipalities should
have full control over the matter of rates and charges and if it had
been believed by the people at the time the home rule provisions
were framed and adopted that control over rates and charges were
necessary to the complete acquisition, construction, owning, leasing
and operating of a public utility, it would have been a very simple
matter to have added such provisions. May it not be assumed that
having failed to do so, the people foresaw the very thing which has
actually happened? It is not difficult to see at this time that to
give municipalities full control over rates and charges for a public
utility municipally owned would cause all limitations upon taxation
to become entirely meaningless and futile.
Conceding Chief Justice Marshall's stature as an Ohio jurist, it
is submitted that his opinion in Roettinger and the decision of the
court in that case are devoid of merit.
In the first place it was only by a strained construction of the
statute in question that the court could find therein a prohibition
against municipal use of water works utility revenues for general
municipal purposes. Such a construction of the statute is difficult to
justify especially in view of the fact that the statute when enacted,
prior to 1912, was intended to be and was a grant of authority and
not a limitation on a pre-existing authority; and in view of the further
fact that the court's interpretation creates a statutory limitation upon
a constitutional power conferred upon municipalities after the passage
of the statute. It is difficult to understand how the court in construing
this statute could find a legislative intent to limit a future grant of
constitutional power to municipalities even if, as was not the case
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with respect to the statute under consideration, the legislature had the
constitutional power to limit the subsequent constitutional grant of
power.
Secondly, how could the court say that municipalities "derive
their authority for levying taxes and raising revenues from the legisla-
ture" in view of the court's earlier decision in Carrel and later deci-
sions in other cases specifically holding that municipalities derive their
authority to levy taxes from section 3 of article XVIII.
3 2
Thirdly, how can it be contended that excessive rates for utility
products or services are taxes? Admittedly municipalities in the
operation of public utilities operate in a proprietary capacity in much
the same manner as privately owned public utilities except with
respect to legislative regulation. Furthermore, it must be conceded
that the establishment of public utility rates is not a legislative func-
tion, otherwise privately owned public utilities could not establish
such rates. Furthermore, under the general forms of government
provided by statute for cities and villages municipal public utility
rates are not even fixed by the legislative authority of the city or
village but by administrative authorities, which fact proves that the
members of the state legislature, at that time, were of the opinion that
the establishment of public utility rates is not a legislative function.33
Unquestionably the levy of taxes is a legislative function and taxes
cannot be imposed by an administrative officer. How then, can it be
argued that excessive public utility rates imposed by municipal ad-
ministrative officers are taxes any more than excessive public utility
rates fixed by privately owned public utilities are taxes? If the rates
charged by the municipal utility to consumers within the municipality
are proper and a cash surplus is created by reason of higher rates
charged to consumers outside the municipality, can it be contended
that the higher rates charged to consumers outside the municipality
are taxes? What justification, either in law or common sense, is there
for Judge Marshall's position?
Fourthly, even Judge Marshall would not go so far as to specifi-
cally say that a statute prohibiting the use of a utility surplus for
general municipal purposes was a limitation on the power of mu-
32 State ex reL. Zielonka v. Carrel, .99 Ohio St. 220, 124 N.E. 134 (1919). Also,
see Clark v. Cincinnati, 163 Ohio St. 532, 127 N.E.2d 363 (1955); Angell v. Toledo,
153 Ohio St. 179, 91 N.E.2d 250 (1950); Marion Foundry Co. v. Landes, 112 Ohio St.
166, 147 N.E. 302 (1925) ; Globe Security and Loan Co. v. Carrel, 106 Ohio St. 43, 138
N.E. 364 (1922).
33 Ohio Rev. Code, §§ 743.04 and 735.29 which confer upon administrative officers
of cities and villages the right to fix public utility rates. See also Ohio Rev. Code,
§§ 731.01 and 731.09 which state that the legislative authority of cities and villages are
vested in the city and village councils.
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nicipalities to levy taxes within the meaning of the provisions of
section 13 of article XVIII. He would only go so far as to say that
such statute was "in the nature of such limitations."
Fifth, Judge Marshall's statement that section 4 of article XVIII
does not confer upon municipalities the right to prescribe rates and
charges for utility services and products is entirely untenable. In
considering this matter it is helpful to remember that section 3 of
article XVIII confers upon municipalities all powers of local self-
government which includes the power to operate public utilities for
the benefit of the inhabitants of the municipality.34 To be absolutely
sure that municipalities would be able to operate public utilities free
from the control of the state legislature, the drafters of article XVIII
granted additional authority to municipalities in sections 4, 6 and 12
of article XVIII to acquire and operate utilities.
Even a cursory perusal of sections 4 and 6 of article XVIII
clearly reveals the fact that those sections confer upon municipalities
the power to establish rates and charges for utility services and
products. All the supreme court decisions dealing with the operation
of municipal public utilities recognize this fact except Roettinger and
the two cases that echo that decision. Any other interpretation of
section 4 of article XVIII renders the four sections of article XVIII
dealing with municipal ownership and operation of public utilities
meaningless because if municipalities do not have constitutional power
to prescribe rates and charges for municipal public utility services and
products, there is no effective constitutional grant of power to munici-
palities to acquire and operate such utilities. As stated in Weiler and
other decisions cited previously herein, section 4 confers upon munici-
palities the power to do all things necessary for the acquisition and
operation of a public utility and no one can contend that fixing rates
and charges to be collected for services rendered and products sold
is not absolutely essential to the acquisition and operation of every
public utility.
The only logical and proper approach to the question presented
in Roettinger is to first recognize, as the supreme court has in prac-
tically all of the other decisions dealing with municipal utilities, that
section 4 of article XVIII confers upon municipalities the right to
establish rates and charges for public utility services and products;
and then proceed to a determination of whether the constitution au-
thorizes the legislature to limit or curtail this constitutional grant of
authority. If this proper approach is utilized then, paraphrasing Judge
Marshall's language, it can be appropriately said that if the people
had intended to give the state legislature the authority to limit a
34 McCann v. Defiance, 167 Ohio St. 313, 148 N.E.2d 221 (1958); supra note 11.
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municipality's power to prescribe public utility rates they would have
said so in section 13 when they gave the legislature the authority to
limit a municipality's power to levy taxes and assessments and incur
debts.
The last statement of Judge Marshall that cannot go unchallenged
is "that to give municipalities full control of rates and charges of a
public utility, municipally owned, would cause all limitations upon
taxation to become utterly meaningless and futile." As previously
pointed out, excessive utility charges by municipalities imposed upon
consumers which the municipality has a duty to serve can be enjoined
by judicial proceeding. But even irrespective of this, section 13 of
article XVIII and section 6 of article XIII do not empower the state
legislature to limit or curtail the authority of a municipality to pre-
scribe utility rates for municipally owned utilities but only empowers
that body to limit municipal taxes and assessments. A charge for
public utility services is not a tax, irrespective of what the supreme
court has said. The supreme court by its ipse dixit cannot convert
such charges into taxes any more than it can convert anything else
into what it is not by a mere ipse dixit. In effect what the supreme
court did in Roettinger was to rewrite the constitution so as to carry
out the desires of the court rather than the people who adopted it. If
applying the provisions of article XVIII as adopted by the people
produces undesirable results, the remedy is not judicial amendment
of the constitution.
In spite of the obvious inconsistencies of the thesis upon which it
is based with other pronouncements of the supreme court, Roettinger,
nevertheless, upholds the right of the General Assembly to prohibit
the use of public utility revenues for general municipal purposes on
the grounds such legislation is a proper limitation upon the power of a
municipality to levy taxes and is the law in this state.
CONCLUSION
Overall, the supreme court decisions dealing with the power of
municipalities to acquire and operate public utilities under the provi-
sions of article XVIII have fairly and properly applied the pertinent
provisions of the constitution except with respect to the use of surplus
utility revenues. The constitutional provisions as adopted by the
people were intended to and do give municipalities the right to operate
public utilities without let or hindrance of the General Assembly and
the courts have so construed these provisions. Whether it is wise to
limit or prohibit state interference with municipal public utility opera-
tions is, of course, a political rather than a legal question. One thing,
however, seems certain in this day and age of gigantic federal govern-
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ment and huge state governments, the individual has less and less to
say with respect to federal and state questions. It is only at the local
level that the individual has much hope of presenting his views and
opinions in governmental matters. If one adopts the philosophy that
government should be kept as close to the people as possible, it
certainly is entirely proper that municipally owned public utility
operations should be governed by the municipality, and not the state
legislature, for only in this way will the voice of the individual, as a
practical matter, ever be heard or have any affect upon the operation
of municipally owned utilities.
